Bateman et al. (2022). A review of planting principles to identify the right place for the right tree for ‘net zero plus’ woodlands: Applying a place-based natural capital framework for Sustainable, Efficient and Equitable (SEE) decisions. People and Nature. [Link to paper]
Eisenbarth, S. (2022). Do exports of renewable resources lead to resource depletion? Evidence on fisheries, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. [Link to paper] [Replication data]
Eisenbarth, S., Graham, L. and Rigterink, A. S. (2021). Can communal resource monitoring save the commons? Evidence on forest loss and displacement, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(29). [Pre-analysis plan] [Replication data] [Link to paper]
Slough, T., Rubenson, D., Levy, R., Rodriguez, F. A., Bernedo del Carpio, M., Buntaine, M., Christensen, D., Cooperman, A., Eisenbarth, S., Ferraro, P., Graham, L., Hartman, A., Kopas, J., Richey, S., Rigterink, A., Samii, C., Seim, B., Urpelainen, J., and Zhang, B. (2021). Adoption of Community Monitoring Improves Common Pool Resource Management Across Contexts, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(29). [Pre-analysis plan] [Replication data] [Link to paper]
Costello, C., Millage, K., Eisenbarth, S., Galarza, E., Ishimura, G., Rubino, L. L., Saccomanno, V., Sumaila, U. R., and Strauss, K. (2021). Ambitious subsidy reform by the WTO presents opportunities for ocean health restoration, Sustainability Science,16: 1391–1396. [Link to paper]
Eisenbarth, S., Graham, L. and Rigterink, A. S. (2021). Can reminders of rules induce compliance? Experimental evidence from a common pool resource setting, Environmental and Resource Economics, 79(4):653–681. [Pre-analysis plan] [Replication data] [Link to paper]
Eisenbarth, S. (2017). Is Chinese trade policy motivated by environmental concerns? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 82: 74-103. [Link to paper]
Are external conservation impacts shifted by internal conservation norms?with Miguel Fonseca and Alex Pfaff [Pre-analysis plan] Conservation interventions increasingly engage not individuals but groups − who differ in their capacity to overcome free-riding to provide local public goods. We successfully generate local variation in the provision of public goods in a lab experiment (N=1,010) where group members possess only partial information concerning others’ contributions. This yields informal norms (i.e., steady group contributions over time), with considerable variation in norms across groups. Into this societyscape, next we introduce two external interventions for public goods provision: (i) payments for contributions to the public good (above groups’ pre-payment baselines), which are temporary as often is the case in practice; and (ii) a forum that is costly to attend, where all information about contributions is shared (as often is intended within village councils globally).We also combine the interventions. We see each intervention raises contributions, on average (18% from a forum and 11% from payments), then we examine whether interventions’ impacts vary with the terciles of pre-intervention contribution norms. Each of these interventions raised contributions for each of our informal contributions norms. Yet, when payments alone ended, only the high norm stayed above pre-payment / no-payment contribution levels, i.e., high norms complemented payments. For high norms, these two interventions themselves were substitutes (if very tentatively in our limited sample). For low norms, the interventions were complements: the forum, if anything, raised the impact of payments both during payments and after they end.
Does trade foster resource management? Evidence on fishing quotas Does international trade change a regulator's ability or incentive to manage a renewable resource sustainably? Theoretical predictions are ambiguous and this is the first empirical analysis to shed light on the effect of trade on resource management. I use detailed country-species level fisheries data to investigate whether trade facilitates the introduction of quota and Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURF) programs for fisheries. The empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between the resource price and the introduction of quota and TURF programs. The values of landings and exports are positively correlated with the introduction of fisheries management.
Work in Progress and Ongoing Projects
Enforcement Campaigns and Compliance with Environmental Standards: Evidence from Central Environmental Inspections in Chinawith Mark Buntaine, Qi Wang and Bing Zhang Carbon leakage resulting from afforestation in the UK,with Alla Golub, Uris Baldos and Brett Day
NetZeroPlus Project: Planting the right trees in the right places to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and achieve other co-benefits with Ian Bateman, Amy Binner, Richard Brazier, Brett Day, Anna Harper, Astley Hastings, Daniel Williamson and others
BioAdd: The economics of biodiversity additionalitywith Ben Groom (PI), Lykke Andersen, Ben Balmford, Charles Palmer, Frank Venmans and Diana Weinhold